



**2017 Halifax International Security Forum
Plenary 2 Transcript
Nukes: The Fire and the Fury**

SPEAKERS:

General John E. Hyten, Commander, United States Strategic Command

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Visiting Fellow, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania and The Brookings Institution

Dr. Sung-han Kim, Dean and Professor, Graduate School of International Studies & Division of International Studies; and Director, Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University

Minister Moshe Ya'alon, Former Minister of Defence of Israel and President, Manhigut Acheret

MODERATOR:

Mr. Steve Clemons, Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic

Mr. Steve Clemons: Good morning everyone. I'm Steve Clemons with The Atlantic Magazine and we're going to have some fun here this morning discussing a very serious subject. Of course, the nuclear shadow, nuclear weapon shadow was part of American culture, movies, national (ph) strategy. The Cold War helped define so much of world affairs and global affairs for so long and then we went through a period I think of kind of amnesia, kind of getting away from nuclear.

So, I'm going to read – name the title of the program today: Nukes, The Fire and the Fury or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. So, let me introduce our panel. It's an extraordinary panel. We have Moshe Ya'alon, Former of Defence of Israel, President of Manhigut Acheret and perhaps a former – a future Prime Minister of Israel but we'll leave that to him to sort out.

General John Hyten, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. He is the Global Command in control of the U.S. Strategic Forces. I asked him what do you not do when you're not doing nuclear weapons and he says, but, I do cyberwar, electronic warfare and everything in space. So, I was asking really about hobbies, but he has a very, very extensive military portfolio.

And we have Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins who was the visiting fellow at the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and The Brookings Institutions and she was the Department of State Coordinator of Threat Reduction Programs in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at State

And we have Sung-han Kim. He's a Dean and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies and Director of Iimin International Relations Institute, at Korea University and he was the former Minister – Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of course for the Republic of Korea.

So thank you all for being here. Let me start with you, General, and ask you about my pop culture reference with Dr. Strangelove and ask you how many times you've seen it?

General John E. Hyten: So, I've seen Dr. Strangelove less than half a dozen times. I don't know the total. It's probably been 10 years since I've seen it. I certainly remember it. I also remember the movie Fail Safe. That's an interesting movie too especially the way that it ends. You have to try to figure out what you think the future is going to be. So, actually, if you watch these movies the – and you watch the movie there with the music over the top. I didn't like the music over the top. I didn't like the music over the top to be honest with you.

Mr. Steve Clemons: But because of the seriousness of it.

General John E. Hyten: Because of the seriousness of it. This is a very serious subject and the world is a very dangerous place right now. And it's important that we look at the world the way it exists, look at the adversaries that we face and my command only has three priorities: number 1, we'll provide strategic deterrence above all else; number 2, if the deterrence fails, we'll have a decisive response and we'll be combat-ready to do it all the time. And that's a very serious mission.

And we have to understand and to be ready all the time. And that's what we focus on so it's nice to kind of step back and look at Dr. Strangelove and look at all those pieces and you know, we actually use way too many Dr. Strangelove's quotes in the command because that's part of the culture. But it's also a culture that many people in the world have forgotten.

Mr. Steve Clemons: That's my big question because I know that you've given your life to this field and profession and you have extraordinary responsibilities. For those you don't know, if President Trump decided to launch a nuclear weapon, General Hyten will be the last person he speaks to or interacts with before that happens. So, you have an extraordinary responsibility not only in

command of the forces, but also in that interaction with the President of the United States who has the nuclear codes.

And – and my reference to the pop culture was not meant to be facetious because one wonders when we were looking at Nan Luger (ph). There was a sense of kind of rolling back the sense that nuclear weapons matter.

And Bonnie, I want to bring you in on this too because I just screened a movie that you'll be able to see in January or February called The Final Year. And it focuses on Barack Obama's last efforts in foreign policy before the change in leadership. And it really highlights Susan Rice, Ben Rhodes who met the power in John Kerry and all the things they were trying to do.

What's interesting is I sat on the edge of four nuclear security summits which the Obama – it doesn't appear in the movie. So, if even with the champions in a vanity film about the Obama administration's foreign policy efforts, if they themselves aren't putting their nuclear security summits that brought world leaders together high on their priorities of achievements and accomplishments, why should we be taking it seriously? You were the point person.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: Well, I'm a little surprised that it wasn't listed as one of the achievements because that was a lot of attention and efforts that were put – that was put into trying to help countries – why they understand why they need to secure nuclear material. There was a lot of interests in that and I recognize that when we actually did the summits – there were four summits that we did between 2010 and 2016.

We were competing with other issues that were always taking place at each summit that we have for example, in the summit that we had in The Hague in 2014 Russian's invasion in the Ukraine took the priority. So there are off other issues that seem were sexy. Often other issues that the media want to pick up, but there was a lot of interests and concerns in making sure the countries understood the importance of nuclear terrorism. So, I'm a little surprised it wasn't in the film because that was certainly something that –

Mr. Steve Clemons: But it's a benchmark of disinterest.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: It is –

Mr. Steve Clemons: It's sort of an important issue as General Hyten just said, but it's a benchmark of an important issue perhaps neglected or shoved in the corner. And So, General, when you think about deterrence today and you've got to have people inculcated sort of with the strategic sensibilities of this, is that a problem? Is deterrence today and doubt, is it something you think about? Are

we not training leaders well enough to know about the strategic equities we have?

General John E. Hyten: So, when I look at deterrence, the fundamentals of deterrence from Shelling (ph) and Connors (ph) are still the same. It's three elements: deny benefits to an adversary; to impose cost on an adversary, and make sure it's credible and communicate effectively to the adversary. And I think that we are stepping forward in doing that, but I'm not sure we understand the full means of what deterrence means in the 21st century, because somehow we've gotten to the point where people think that under the new Star Treaty we have fifteen hundred and fifty (1,550) deployed nuclear weapons. The Russians have fifteen hundred and fifty (1,550) deployed nuclear weapons and somehow that will deter our adversaries.

That's deterrence. That's not deterrence in the 21st century. That's the Cold War mindset of deterrence. Deterrence today has to involve – yes, it starts with the nuclear weapons but it also considers deterring catastrophic activities in space and cyberspace. It involves the conventional elements. It involves all the instruments in national powers and our allies working together in order to deter our adversaries from behaviour that we don't want.

And we don't think effectively about that broader deterrence construct very much and so when you actually go back, you go back to economy. You go back to shelling and you don't think about this news. So, we've put together an academic alliance where we're trying to get the academic community and the think-tanks again to start thinking about what deterrence is in the 21st century, because it is – it is very different. The nuclear piece is still a piece of it but it's much broader.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Moshe, I want to ask you about what we're seeing today in our world, because a lot of what we're – reasons that nukes are back as a topic is what we're seeing play out with North Korea, the negotiations and Iran on nuclear deal. Nuclear weapons are back as a big clarifying subject of focus of strategists again. And as small countries like North Korea and others pursuing nuclear weapons programs, what insights do you have about small countries pursuing nuclear weapons?

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: It seems that the Middle East is far away from those (inaudible) but there are many implications and everything. APEC ongoing conflict with North Korea, to what is going on in the Middle East especially as we go on to Iran. And the difference between Iran and the analogy and the North Korean regime is the North Korean regime keeps their weapons and they have already the weapons in order to defend themselves, in order to blackmail United States, other parties and the region, but they don't have any aspirations to export revolution and dominism (ph) or whatever out of the country.

Iran idea is to have the weapons first of all to defend themselves, to be immune from any attack but to use it as an umbrella to be able to intensify their activities to gain hegemony in the region. So far they do it without the nuclear weapons. We believe that nuclear weapon will be more dangerous to the region. That's why we claim – this is our policy – that by one way or another the nuclear – the military nuclear project in Iran should be stopped, and so far to try to stop it by pressure, by diplomacy, but to be ready for the day to come to stop it by any and all enemy.

Mr. Steve Clemons: I'll dig just a little bit deeper. How do I put this diplomatically? A lot of folks think, you know, Israel of course has about two hundred (200) nuclear warheads. So, you're already over that line. My question to you is if that were the case, why is it deterrence working in your theatre? Has that helped you achieve anything if you have to engage in potential conventional conflict to stop other potential nuclear aspirations in other countries, what are those nuclear weapons buy you? And I want to come to Sung-han Kim because it raises the interesting other question of why doesn't South Korea particularly if it has worries about its future in the sovereignty of American nuclear umbrella, why doesn't it just develop nuclear weapons?

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: Israel has certain capabilities and if this is the case we prove to be rational, responsible governments we use. And actually, I believe that because of this perception in the region we will not attack by weapons of mass destructions. Egypt used chemical weapons again in Yemen in '62. In '67, when they were defeated on the conventional battlefield the first option is to use chemical weapons against us.

The Egyptians don't use it because they believe that we have certain capabilities. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Kurdian Halabja (ph). In '91, he launched missiles towards Israel. He didn't dare use chemical weapons and Bashar al-Assad as well. So, we now are tough neighbourhood. The perception that we have certain capabilities is very important to deter them from using war weapons of mass destruction against us.

Mr. Steve Clemons: So, Sung-han, why doesn't South Korea move more expeditiously towards the possession of certain capabilities?

Dr. Sung-han Kim: Because we are responsible member State of the NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which is one of the key pillars of the post-Cold War international order. For the past 25 years, we have been trying to stop North Korea's nuclear pursuit for their own strategic purposes, but until now we haven't come out with any kind of a solution. So, we in 1991 signed on so-called Denuclearization Declaration on the Korean Peninsula. So we have been trying

to keep the promise, stick to that kind of declaration but North Korea has violated the Declaration by pursuing nuclear weapons.

If you look at North Korean kind of territory, they have already deployed almost 1,000 short range ballistic missiles. They are now on the verge of succeeding the development of nuclear ICBM capabilities that can destroy the mainland of the United States. This is not just a threat to the national security of the United States, but the alliance system of the United States which means US key allies such as Republic of Korea and Japan do not fully trust nuclear umbrella provided by the United States once the US mainland will be threatened by North Korea's ICBM.

So for now, we are relying on so-called extended deterrence or nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. But we have to think about plan B which means we need to come up with some other alternatives when we on – the fact that our diplomatic efforts have been a failure. We can explore three options: the completion of nuclear fuel cycle while relying on US-provided nuclear umbrella, or redeployment of US nuclear tactical weapons back to South Korea as we had during the Cold War days. The third option is for South Korea to go nuclear. So, we can probably think of three options in the future as a plan B, but for now we are making almost (ph) effort.

Mr. Steve Clemons: General, would you be okay (ph) to point tactical nukes back into South Korea?

General John E. Hyten: I do not. That was a question for me?

Mr. Steve Clemons: Yes.

General John E. Hyten: So, I do not and I just went to Korea about six weeks ago. I met with General Jong (ph), Minister Sung (ph). I got to meet President Kim. The reason I went was to guarantee that the deterrent capabilities that this nation provides and my nation provides is there for that part of the world. I think that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is an important element of the structure and that requires the United States to provide an extended deterrence for a number of our allies. And we do that.

And I want to make sure that that is understood by our allies because I think that is the best posture, because in my opinion the more nuclear weapons we have in the world, the less secure the world is.

Mr. Steve Clemons: So, let me ask you odd questions. The reason why this session is so important, I think, and consequential – we're going to get to all of you soon – is that I don't think anyone believes that North Korea under any circumstances other than forced or shoved will denuclearize. I just don't believe

that. Maybe they'll be our last. Does anybody believe that North Korea will kind of take Donald Trump's message and capitulate and give up its nuclear weapons? Please, share your hand. There's not – well, there's one out here. So, I'm going to come back to you later.

And so, if you're not in that and you've got North Korea essentially survives somewhat through extortion, you know, behaves badly in the world and gets paid off not to behave badly and then goes through another cycle, and now as Sung-han Kim just said has a technical competence in miniaturization of warheads and the delivery of those systems that no longer can be ignored in any way.

And so we're at the point where you say what to do? This is why we're having this discussion and so I guess I would like to ask all of you, you know, I hear it's about sanctions. I mean North Korea is a 40 billion dollar economy. It survives through prostitution, drug dealing. It's basically a big narco gain country, in my view. And so in that, you know, some of our discussions seem so irrelevant to the realities of curtailing (ph) North Korea. And it has taken us this box at the President of the United States has said we need to do something different. H.R. McMaster has said we need to do something different that the time for talks and appeasement are over.

And Dr. Kim I know that you worry about this and so this seems like a different time. Are you ready for war?

Dr. Sung-han Kim: Not really. I think still we need to explore diplomatic solutions.

Mr. Steve Clemons: What does that mean really? Is it appeasement?

Dr. Sung-han Kim: Not appeasement. This is bringing North Korea back to the negotiation table through what President Trump said through maximum pressure. Quite frankly for the past 25 years we didn't have a chance to implement real sanctions, but after North Korea conducted the six nuclear tests, I think we came up with some package of real sanctions even though it is not quite sufficient.

China is making effort if not on most (ph). For example, North Korea you know the State companies they went into North-Eastern part of China and created kind of a pseudo-Chinese you know companies who are working on behalf of North Korea's regime importing, you know, Swiss cheese from Switzerland or luxury goods, Mercedes-Benz and also importing some – some goods for the missile parts, you know, nuclear weapons.

We need to punish them. We need to target them and also China has agreed to you know put some limit on the import and export of key export items of North Korea. So we have discovered some fatal spots of North Korea. So, I think we need to explore these efforts with the help of China then probably this is not for the sake of bringing down or taking down the North Korean regime. We need to bring them to the negotiating table for the denuclearization.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Moshe, I want you to critique what Dr. Kim just said. Is that enough in your experience in war and peace? If you were – let's just make you the president of South Korea. What actions would you be taking that they're not, from an Israeli frame point – frame? That you would be taking with North Korea that's not happening? Presuming you had not already bombed them.

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: We have a saying in Hebrew, in order to have peace you should be ready for war. And in order really to deter your enemies, you should demonstrate domination, political stomach (ph), whatever in order to be ready for war. What we have seen now in – regarding North Korea as you know is watching from the side irrational player in North Korea. And the exchange of irrational words from the American side which I believe plays —

Mr. Steve Clemons: The old and historic and the fat (ph). Yes.

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: You know and it might be that we what (inaudible) the silence on behalf of Moscow is the result of the fear (ph). If you have irrational player you should demonstrate irrationality if I'm ready to all the way in order to deter him. And this I believe this is the case. But really you can't say that I'm not ready for war and the other side is ready to go all the way.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Bonnie, what would you do if you were in charge of South Korea?

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: Well, I agree with the process of trying to use sanctions. I think we have to do what we can to get —

Mr. Steve Clemons: What he's saying – I mean, it's got to be the most sanctioned country in the world.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: It is.

Mr. Steve Clemons: It seems like a ridiculous discussion.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: It is and this is and actually right now that seems the only thing that we have available. But —

Mr. Steve Clemons: So, the only thing that is available has shown itself to be completed ineffective for decades.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: We do need to start thinking of new things, think of new ways so approach the situation —

Mr. Steve Clemons: Any idea of what those new things and new ways might —

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins: Well, one of the things that I wrote about was how do we bring in other — and I know that the region really wants to work a country than a region, but I think we need to consider how do we bring in other discussion, how do we bring in other partners into this — this very old effort to try to prevent North Korea from doing certain things which obviously we failed with nuclear weapons.

I think we have learned some lessons in the way in which we've approached Iran. I know that there's been some discussions about how successful that's been but for the most part we have no reason to assume from what we're hearing about — from IEA (ph) and from US Intelligence that there's reason to be concerned about Iran right now and violating that agreement. So in my sense I think we've learned something from the way which we approach —

Mr. Steve Clemons: Isn't the US sort of violating that agreement?

Ambassador B. Jenkins: The US is violating, but nevertheless we have other partners who are part of that agreement. And I think that, you know, we should stay and confer (ph) with that agreement, but I think there's lessons learned that we've learned — learned from that situation that maybe we can apply here in Korea. Only in the sense of ways in which we can negotiate and ways in which we can approach the situation that maybe bring in other partners, you know, maybe there's room to bring in countries outside the region.

And I see you shaking your head so I know it's new different thinking, but I think we're at the point that maybe we should be a little more open to other options.

Mr. Steve Clemons: General, I want to wrap this up with you and then go to the audience. I'm interested in this question of just the soundness of our — of our strategic arsenal and we were just talking about Cheyenne Mountain, the extraordinary fact that Mike Allen Axios recent — just sent an email out with his daily beef focused on Cheyenne Mountain, what would an attack on North Korea look like? Where it would happen? And you told me you used to work in Cheyenne Mountain. It used to be a pretty crappy place.

And so, I'm interested in this question of where we are in terms of the solvency of our nuclear arsenal and that being communicated as it — because everyone I

know tells me our systems are basically not necessarily modern, that we have a lot gaps in the system. We're thinking of spending about 1.7 trillion dollars over 30 years. And so, when you're out there basically trying to, you know, send a message to adversaries watch out, we're the, you know, slickest band in town when it comes to possible deployment of nuclear assets. How save is our system? How modern is our system? What do you worry about?

General John E. Hyten: So, it's safe, secure, alive or ready today. We exercised it every day. It's not modern. I have no concerns about the capabilities of the system today or the next few years, but I am concerned about the capabilities in the late '20s or late '30s because the men (ph) at ICBM, the three stages at ICBM, eventually it has to be replaced. Submarines can be built for amazing capabilities but at some point in time they don't go under the water any more just because they've been under the water so many times.

We're coming to the end of lives of a lot of our critical capabilities and we have to modernize. It's interesting you talked about President Obama. The Obama administration I think if you read the speech in Prague in 2009, it's an amazing speech about a nuclear-free world. I don't think we'll ever get nuclear-free world myself but it's an amazing speech to read.

But it's also President Obama that in the last two years of administration made a commitment to modernize the entire nuclear try (ph) again, to modernize the ICBM, the bomber, the submarine, the cruise missile, the nuclear command and control and the weapons. Why did he make that decision? And why is it being supported by the current administration? It's because the threats in the world require that. And if the threats in the world require that we're going to modernize it again.

But if you walk in my command centre and you sit down and you watch and Secretary Mattis was out at the end of September and it was the last launch of the long range missile from Korea happened – happened to be in our headquarters and he walked down with me and he sat right next to me as we processed the entire event. And the thing – he looked at me and he said, you have exquisite situation awareness whatever things that happen here.

Because I actually watched the missile take off, fly, impact. I can see it all from my command centre. I can provide the right recommendations of what to do. But his direction to me and the President's direction to me is to create the conditions for diplomacy to work by being ready all the time. And we are ready every minute of every day to respond to any event that comes out of North Korea. That's the element of deterrence that has to be clear.

And it is clear. If he goes down that path it will not end well. But we want is to create the room for diplomacy and sanctions to work. And the only reason I

didn't raise my hand on your question a while ago was because you asked the question wrong. President Trump by himself can't change the behaviour of Kim Jong-un. But President Trump can create the conditions that the international community can reach out in different ways where we can work with the Republic of Korea, where we can work with our neighbours in the region.

We can work with China. We can work with others to try to find a solution to that. So, we're going to keep every bit of pressure that we can on it and we're ready to respond right now – right now at this moment.

Mr. Steve Clemons: The other day I watched your predecessor Robert Keller speak in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about this incredibly responsibility that you now have in that conversation with the President before nuclear things. And he said, you know, that – he implied that he could push back. Have you thought about that conversation you might have with the President in this sort of scenario?

General John E. Hyten: I have and we talk about it. I think some people think we're stupid. We're not stupid people. We think about these things a lot. When you have this responsibility how do you not think about it? And so – but what people forget is this is a military mission and a military function. And since the day I joined the service, 36 years ago, every year I get trained in a law of armed conflict. And the law of armed conflict has certain principles and necessities, distinction, proportionality, unnecessary suffering. All those things are defined.

And we get, you know, for 20 years it was the William Kelly Meli (ph) thing that we were trained on because if you execute an unlawful order you will go to jail. You could go to jail for the rest of your life. It applies to nuclear weapons. It applies to small arms. It applies to small unit tactic. It applies to everything and we apply it as we go through it. It's not that difficult. And the way the process works – if you want to get the details later, I'll go into the details later.

The way the process works is this simple: I provide advice to the President. He'll tell me what to do and if it's illegal, guess what's going to happen?

Mr. Steve Clemons: You say no.

General John E. Hyten: I'm going to say, Mr. President, it's illegal. And guess what he's going to do? He's going to say what would be legal? And we'll come up with options of a mix of capabilities to respond to whatever the situation is. And that's the way it works. It's not that complicated.

Mr. Steve Clemons: I think it's an interesting story that not many people in the world nor Americans here and so it's interesting to actually be walked through the process as they did with these very key decisions. In fact, because I think

we have had a period of amnesia about what nuclear weapons in the world means and how to handle money.

Ambassador B. Jenkins: Sorry to jump – because you asked us for –

Mr. Steve Clemons: Yes.

Ambassador B. Jenkins: I just wanted to highlight the point that you made about creating the right environment, because clearly the environment right now is not one where you can have diplomacy. So you need to really, you know, ratchet it down, the rhetoric, and create an environment where we have – can have these discussions. And we can bring in these other partners who can actually play a role in this.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Right, thank you. Peter MacKay.

Peter MacKay: Thank you very much, Steve, and welcome all. Wonderful to have you home in Halifax. This is a city that has experienced not a nuclear explosion but up until Hiroshima the largest man-made explosion. Within eyesight of this hotel, a munition ship collided in the harbour – thousands of casualties, thousands of deaths. America came to our aid and we've been grateful, of course, ever since.

My question to the panel and our Turkish General Akar referenced the fact that terrorist elements – we focus a lot on Iceland Dash (ph), but we haven't had as much discussion of late naturally because of North Korea and the ongoing menace of Iran, but about rogue elements, non-State actors coming into possession of nuclear weapons, nuclear capacity. Not necessarily a bomb, a dirty bomb on a ship, a container ship.

So my question is your view on that possibility – I don't want to say inevitability – and General Hyten do you directly since we're in Canada – one of the discussions that has been revived here is about a Northern warning, working in cooperation with NORAD Canada upping its game, its contribution. I'd like to see us part of the six-party talks as well, but let's focus on what we can do practically as a deterrent for North America. Should we be doing more through NORAD? This is something that we've long debated. Something I think that's – like your system has to be updated. The Arctic – if a strike is to come to North America is very likely to come over our airspace over the Arctic. Thank you.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Moshe is the first one. Rogue elements.

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: Thank you, Peter, for the question. I don't know about any terror organization which is able to produce a bomb. It had become a big issue after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And we had certain channels in

which intelligence communities had to deal with it. So far, so good. We had a fight (ph) in Israel that if Iran become military nuclear they provide such a device, to a NATO organization to use it against us.

Mr. Steve Clemons: John?

General John E. Hyten: So, the threats we look at across the world we kind of categorize it to a phrase called four plus one: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran plus violent extremists. We have to look at those potential threats across the entire spectrum, including weapons of mass destruction which includes a lot more than nuclear, but we have to look at the nuclear piece as well.

My command used to have the responsibility for looking at countering weapons of mass destruction. That's now been transfer – transitioned into Special Operations Command. The Special Forces guys actually have some very unique capabilities. If we do discover something like that to figure out how to go in, find it, secure it and move on. That's why we've adjusted it. But we still focus on that capability. We watch for it very closely. We defend our assets. We defend our nuclear materials and we match very closely what happens around the world because we can't allow that kind of expansion, proliferation to happen into the plus-one element of our strategy.

Dr. Sung-han Kim: I think, know, nuclear as security – at security summit should continue in that sense.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Good luck with that.

Dr. Sung-han Kim: Yes. I think that was really genuine, decent effort to think about nuclear security. We have been focusing on some rogue States but since September 11 terrorist attack, you know, non-State actors. If, you know, the WMD are put into the hands of those terrorists, you know, they are willing to die, you know. The rationality is unworkable for them. So the conventional deterrence kind of catalyst (ph) is not to be applied to those terrorists. So in that sense I think how to manage nuclear materials or all kinds of things so we agree upon should be, you know, followed up with kind of an updated kind of a cooperative measures. In that sense I think this kind of effort should continue.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Bonnie, you want to —

Ambassador B. Jenkins: Yes. I just wanted to briefly – and you kind of started what I was going to talk about which is just two things: one is the nuclear summit which is – so it's happened four times during the Obama administration. And a lot of work that went on with that was to target exactly what you're talking about which is a concern of non-State actors. And it was – the focus of the

summit was to prevent non-State actors of getting their hands on nuclear material and radiation (ph) sources as well to take care of the dirty bomb.

So, whether there is nuclear security summit in the future what's important is States commit to and they continue to implement the commitments that they made to the nuclear security process, to communiques (ph), to the action plans. There is a lot of grievances that were made and it's important that countries continue to abide by the agreements that were made during the process.

Secondly, one of the major things I did in the government was focusing on this very issue. My portfolio was Coordinator of Threat Reduction Programs which are programs that you're talking about to be (inaudible) hands of weapons of mass destruction. And there is a lot of activities going on in the US, around the world with other countries on this specific issue to prevent that from happening. So, it is a big issue even though we haven't really talked a lot about it. It does get a lot of attention in resources.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Thank you. Jane? I promised to get to as many people as we can and we'll – lightning rounds. So Jane.

Jane Harman: Your moderation of this panel is absolutely superb and General Hyten, I'm – I'm comforted that you're the last phone call Donald Trump will make before he makes his final decision on what to do. You're the one who raised that we're not just talking about nukes anymore. We're talking about other catastrophic weapons, including cyber and I think that's fascinating. My question is not about that though I think it's fascinating but is about the comment that Bonnie made that we maybe need to expand the group that is putting pressure on North Korean. Who else could play in a big way? Russia? NATO? Any other folks represented here?

Ambassador B. Jenkins: Well, I was with – the reference I made to Iran who was really about, you know, Germany and France are obviously involved and have experience in working on these types of issues. So, I would include Germany. I would include France. I would include some international organizations. The IEA should be not so much as putting pressure but obviously playing the role that they would play in making sure that countries are either, you know, abiding by commitments that relate to nuclear weapons issues.

So, I would certainly have those two and then I would be, you know, open to others but I think the important thing is that we take advantage of what we've learned and bring – I think we need to start thinking differently and we need to start thinking – sometime you think differently or bringing different people at the table – to the table and you can develop different strategies. I think we can't lose if we think –

Mr. Steve Clemons: If I may, because this is something – James (inaudible) who's not here has advocated a naval blockade, but you know the notion isn't just a blockage. The question is if North Korea essentially survives through illicit trade, smuggling, the movement of cash through connections of things, we're talking about banks and formal facilities and I just want to put that on the table that we may need to change the way we think what the pressure points are in putting North Korea – I don't think we are. And that's why when I'm commenting on MSNBC and someone talks about another round of sanctions I, you know, I almost want to jump out of my seat because it – that's not how North Korea survives. Those aren't the pressure points. But thank you. Yes, Sir, you said North Korea is going to give up nuclear weapons on its own. So share – tell us who you are and – just give me like five seconds on why you think that's going to happen.

Yamaguchi: Okay. My name is Yamaguchi (ph) from Japan. Lieutenant-General retired. I think we don't have to give it up. That's it. We need to get back to the basics. North Korea should abandon nuclear and the missile program complete in a manner of complete – very viable and evassible (ph). That is a concept among the wars, the rest (ph) of the wars. So we need to pursue that. I know that for the – we may have a number of different options, including media (ph) options from the effects (ph) the different options to actually use a weapon. Maybe including some – some conditions which we might call war, but our goal is to erase possible nuclear – new nuclear (inaudible) to the world otherwise if we limit this condition, we are looking watching while everybody even small malicious country if they – if they have ICBM and nuclear warhead they can be equal to the United States. That's the – what we need to avoid. (Transcriber's note: this speaker has a very strong accent and is difficult to understand.)

Mr. Steve Clemons: So, just to clarify when you raised your hand before, you were not saying that North Korea would self-select denuclearization. It needs to be forced or compelled.

Yamaguchi: The – we can make the condition – condition under which Kim-Jong is forced to abandon his idea.

Mr. Steve Clemons: So, you're not the outrider (ph) I thought you were. Josef Joffe.

Josef Joffe: Thank you. Two questions. One, this mysterious expansion of relevant powers in the game to the Ambassador, I don't quite understand how bringing in France or Germany may be even the great State of Italy will do – will be more productive than the United States and the two other big players although they are not formally so, Russian and China.

The other question is of interest to Dr. Kim. I don't – you went through the three options and two of them are pretty tough: technical nuclear weapons are going nuclear. I don't see how – how that is even remotely part of the South Korea universe which has played a very ambivalent game —

Mr. Steve Clemons: Yes, and have you talked to Munjay (ph) about this?

Josef Joffe: And very ambivalent. I mean they were even hesitant to deploy antimissile systems and they're always oscillating between sunshine policy and talking tough. I mean, how do you conceive of your country going through either of those two tough options?

Mr. Steve Clemons: Great question. I'm going to start with Dr. Kim.

Dr. Sung-han Kim: That's a very good question even though I'm going to be having some difficulty in answering that question. Ambivalence that's because of so-called souse-souse (ph) conflict within my country. Some liberal forces who will try to engage North Korea on the one hand and the conservative forces who will try to teach lessons to North Korea. So, this kind of ideological struggles have been going on for the last 25 years. So, that's one thing. And another thing is our relationship with China are okay. China trade volume is larger than our K (ph) US plus our K Japan combined which means we have heavily dependent on China economically. That's why China is trying to take advantage of this card, economic card, for their own strategic purposes which has exposed South Korea to many kinds of pressures even when, you know, decided to deploy THAAD system just to you know against possibly threats by North Korea.

But as I mentioned last night, China is always looking at North Korea through the lens of US-China strategic competition which means northern (ph) issue is not to be isolated from other strategic issues such as Taiwan or East China Sea or South China Sea problems. This means as doctor, you knew, Henry Kissinger pointed out in Wall Street Journal article, kind of a common understanding between US and China would be a kind of prerequisite for the solution of this problem which means these two big players need to talk to each other. South Korea is —

Mr. Steve Clemons: Let me just pursue that for a minute and Bonnie I want you to come in very quickly and there's a zillion questions out here and I'm going to be hated by everyone because I won't be able to get to all of them. But on the China-Russia question we came to a common understand with China and Russia on Iran. So, we went through an exercise on the Iran deal. China and Russia were strongly supportive – in fact, Russia was really vital in very, very key ways.

And so, when Joe (ph) asks about a roster of potential unnecessary allies which you said in your answer, how do you actually go through another process with Russia and China on a nuclear challenge after basically kicking the heck out of the Iran deal? So, I'm going to piggy-back. But Bonnie, can you respond to Joe?

Ambassador B. Jenkins: Well, I think before we have any other countries part of the discussion we of course have to talk with the countries who are in your region. So, you know, I'm not assuming that we just have a – everybody get together all of a sudden. There has to be discussions that lead up to it. Is there a guarantee that if you had more countries, it will make a difference? We don't know, but we have – we know, we know which is that we're at a stalemate right now.

We know that the environment has changed. We know that it's maybe an opportunity to see what advantages we can add by bringing in some countries who have been part of some of those other discussions like Iran. Would they be willing to come back in for another – for another debate? That's something that we can also pursue.

But I think the other thing is also to think about the fact that looking at the region and North Korean nuclear weapon affects – it's a global issue and I understand that it affects the region most predominantly. But there is – there is a question about whether other countries may have – want to have more of a say in it. And I think we haven't exploited that yet.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Thank you. So, we're going to do some lightning rounds here to get a lot more voices in and so, 30 seconds. Sir. Oh, Doug (ph), how did you get the mike? Go ahead, yes.

Doug: Not only that, you told me to ask questions.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Exactly.

Doug: I'd like to pick up on the China point again because quite frankly the difference between Iran and China is that everybody wants to do – Iran and North Korea rather, everybody wanted to do business with Iran and that was a huge incentive for everybody jumping in. It's not the case with North Korea. And so, I think it's correct that it really is between us and China. And my question therefore is with the President just having been there and having made nice to Mr. Xi making nice to the President and nothing coming out of it, what exactly should we do with China more than we're already doing to get to actually –

Mr. Steve Clemons: Great question. Let's take this gentleman here I was trying to get to. Right to your left.

Question: 1983 —

Mr. Steve Clemons: Who are you?

Question: Oh, sorry, my name is Paul Dewar, I'm a former member of Parliament here in Canada. 1983, Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet military person responsible for the nuclear launch – we'll all recall forgotten in his own home when he died recently – was given an order to launch and he didn't and it's a good thing. And remember, this was just after the shooting down of a Korean jet. But I'm asking the question – my question in this context. I'm very concerned about the communication between powers at this point. I think it's deteriorated. We have open communications with the P5, through that. To the General, do we still have those communications? And are we on top of that file to make sure that we don't have an accident? And finally, is NPT dead?

Mr. Steve Clemons: It's a lot. You guys, that was a very effective 30 seconds. So right here, jack 1.

Question: Thank you. Jackie (inaudible), Inclusive (ph) Security. I want to talk about the strategy related to negotiations with North Korea and the fact that the majority of all engagements has been predicated on progress on the nuclear issue first. And with any other negotiation you don't take the entanglement of issues and focus only on the single biggest hardest issue and keep tightening and tightening that knot. You work on issues around it as well and softening that. So, I'm wondering if you have – what your insights would be on broadening the set of issues that we're dealing with in North Korea to include reconciliation, peace agreement, territorial disputes, humanitarian reconciliation, humanitarian assistance —

Mr. Steve Clemons: More than we have time for, but it's a great list (cross talk).

Question: Sorry. It is a question of broadening not just the actors but the issues so that nuclear doesn't become the only and entirety of our focus of negotiations.

Mr. Steve Clemons: I don't know if Mike Gloss (ph) is here but he's written a great piece in The Atlantic to just – to add on to what Jackie just said which is perhaps we should actually be offering North Korea to help them secure and keep safe he warheads they have. It was a very provocative thing for a guy from AEI (ph) to write but I just wanted to give him credit for it because it's very —

Question: (inaudible) Key Director of the Politic Institute of (inaudible). I have the following question. From the conventional point of view North Korea, Europe, the Middle East there are separate theatres of operations. But from the strategic

point of view, from the point of view of nuclear deterrence, they're interlinked. How we should adapt first our thinking then our strategic and defence posture to the situation if something goes wrong in North Korean?

Mr. Steve Clemons: Thank you. And then this gentleman right here. We have a mike over here. Just toss it.

Question: My name is (inaudible) NK News. My question is to General Hyten. The US has been able to live with a nuclear ICBM-capable China and Russia for many years. Can we do the same with North Korea?

Mr. Steve Clemons: Great. So, I'm going to pause there because – and we've got a question: can we live with a nuclear-tip ICBM capability? Should we broaden the sets of issues that we should be discussing which Jackie just raised? How are our sets of communications between the different players? Is NPT dead? And frankly what, you know, finally Doug (ph) what more can we be doing with China that we aren't already doing to get a strategic alignment around North Korea? So, let me start with you, Dr. Kim.

Dr. Sung-han Kim: I think so-called the secondary boycott should be expanded, should be implemented in a comprehensive manner by the United States. The UN Security Council is likely to be blocked by key players like China and Russia. In order for us to more China further to solve this problem, I think many of third entities who are trading with North Korean government and North Korean national companies should be on the spot so that they have to be, you know, prevented from what they have been doing. Otherwise, you know, we cannot focus on the real targets. Then I think China will begin to move.

Trump administration has taken some measures closer to the real secondary boycott but my suggestion is to implement this sanction in a more comprehensive manner.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Thank you. Bonnie, one minute.

Ambassador B. Jenkins: I think I would just pick up on the point of another subject matter (cross talk) field. I think a number of people as you had mentioned have written on how our discussion with North Korea should include other issues like biological weapons or even human rights or some of these other things that's an issue. But also, I mean if you – not to always refer to the Iran Agreement but that's the kind of – what I'm looking at right now.

There are other things in Iran Agreement that of course takes advantage of the fact that countries wanted to do business with Iran. But also, you know, setting a working group with them, looking at issues of nuclear security. There are other things in that Agreement that was trying – that the goal is to set up a dialogue on

other issues that can hopefully strengthen relationships. Now, whether that will work or not, you know, it was trying to look at it more holistically and how we can fix the situation by looking at other issues.

Mr. Steve Clemons: General?

General John E. Hyten: So, perhaps the question can we live with a nuclear North Korea? The answer is yes, but the question we have to ask ourselves do we want to live in that world? Is a world without a nuclear North Korea a better world than a world with a nuclear North Korea? That's what we have. We can live in any world that presents itself. We can figure out how to defend ourselves against that world. But what world do we want to live in? That's what we need to work to with our allies.

And then the question about relationships with our adversaries – we have still good communications in emergencies with Russia. We're working on improved communications with the other elements of our adversaries, China in particular. We've had good visits recently at the senior level. I continually advocate for more military nuclear relationships between the military leadership of the United States not only with our allies like we have here, but also with our adversaries. And I don't think we do enough of that with our adversaries and there's a lot of reasons for that I won't go into but we need to do more of it.

Mr. Steve Clemons: Moshe?

Minister Moshe Ya'alon: We have to admit that the policy exercise to North Korea is a failure. We have already a military and nuclear in North Korea and we have to learn the lessons of history. As an analogy (ph) and as an example this is a lesson of history. In order to prevent another military nuclear war regime like in Iran, we have to demonstrate determination. Just as an example, without exercising military option after Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003, Muammar Gaddafi, gave up his military nuclear project without a single shot. And Khamenei decided to suspend it. Why? Because they realize that it may be targeted on the third phase of the American offensive, Afghanistan the first one; Iraq the second one. The same question among leaders in our region, who might be targeted next? So, and of course a combination of political isolation, economic sanctions, credible military option, those elements should be exercised on such regimes before going to the military option itself.

Never mind, you might reach this kind of strategic posture by certain even minor activities especially on behalf of the United States, in the Middle East and elsewhere. I have a lot examples which actually weaken the American posture in the Middle East because of decision not to go and to hit Syria after using the chemical weapons and other examples. So my bottom line, we still need global policemen. Talking – going back to what we talked yesterday, international law.

The only one to keep it is the United States. So, let's – let's have America care to delegate.

Mr. Steve Clemons: I want to thank all of you. I'm very, very sorry that we weren't able to get to more questions. I want to compliment the Halifax Forum to having this subject and just share two vignettes as we close and thank all of you. It's while we – you were making a comment about the music over this where I was joking about Dr. Strangelove and say, there is a kind of humour that one can recklessly bring to this subject, but it's a very, very sobering serious subject. And I went back and looked at the first nuclear briefing that Bill Clinton got on inauguration morning at 7:00 a.m. in 1993. And an observer said they had never seen him more silent and a more sober than ever after that meeting. Scolcroft (ph) apparently left that meeting to walk back to the Blair House with tears just reaming around his eyes in terms of the seriousness of that issue.

Tony Blair warned at points the pressures of nuclear command which here you're part of are staggering and required enormous composure, judgment, restraint and diplomatic skills. And so while we may see flamboyance out there that are fundamentally in the structure are very, very important life and death decisions for millions of people. So I want to thank you so much Moshe Ya'alon, John Hyten, Bonnie – Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins and Sung-han Kim. Thank you both – all very much. Thank you.